Crash at OBA

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odeaj
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Post by odeaj »

Cheers Ian,

Sounds like good advice. I'm sure OBA can be quite 'persuasive' though ;-) Still, it's my money and therefore ultimately my decision I presume

bean_ian
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Post by bean_ian »

As my course was ending they took delivery of 2 new liberties which helped ease the congestion and im sure they have expanded since then too but up to that point if a liberty went tech it was game over until it was fixed, whereas i had a few cessna's go tech on me and I just grabbed the keys to another one.
If i was hour building I would definitely get a liberty, they look so comfy compared to the cessna and as you said they have a lot of equipment thats makes your life alot easier. What sort of usable load do they have? Similar to the 150?

Cheers
Ian

Lambada Crazy
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Post by Lambada Crazy »

yeah, its 533lbs if i can remember, im not too sure though.
When a flight is proceeding incredibly well, something was forgotten.

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Post by ppl_student »

Teaching at OBA is as good as any other training school, it all depends on your individual instructor. What I found (and I am open for others to disagree) was that the younger instructors tend to be far more cautious than the more experienced instructors, not that the experienced instructors are in any way reckless, but the younger instructors understandably don't want to see their career finished before it starts. Availability depends on luck as much as anything, when I was there in June, there were arround 10 XL2s and for the first 2 weeks, availability was VERY tight due to the fact there were a comparatively high number of XL2 hour builders, however in the 3rd week availability improved. As for converting over to a C150, carb heat/ mixture i didn't find it too hard to adjust, its like as Mike would say, training in an automatic car to then go to a manual, you soon get used to it. Feel free to give me a shout if you have any questions
PPL Student

Lambada Crazy
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Post by Lambada Crazy »

Funny enough, i can see your point but i would have thought otherwise, i was with one instructor and he was i suppose mid 20s, we went on a cross country to sanford and he didnt have a clue!!!!!, you could tell he was only there to build his hours!!!
When a flight is proceeding incredibly well, something was forgotten.

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Post by JFH »

q
Last edited by JFH on Sun Mar 10, 2013 10:06 pm, edited 1 time in total.

N714GZ
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Post by N714GZ »

Mr Crow,

I intentionally made a sarcastic reply to someone who saw a picture of an aircraft and made a sweeping statement.

mr crow wrote:I would not even sit in one of them thing's!


Im glad that you now have changed your opinion based on the hard facts provided by your friend.

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Post by mr crow »

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Last edited by mr crow on Sun Jan 10, 2010 11:46 pm, edited 1 time in total.

CaptCream
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N550XL Accident Report

Post by CaptCream »

NTSB 6120 Narrative - Aircraft Accident N550XL

"The company has a policy and standard operating procedure (SOP) for all solo operations that "touch and go's" are not permitted.
Additionally for Student pilots undergoing solo flight the following additional limitations are endorsed:

Max. Wind: 12 knots
Max Crosswind: 06 knots
Visibility: 5 s.m.
Ceiling: 2,000 feet

The day prior to the accident the Student achieved solo status and pre-solo training requirements under FAA FAR Part 61. The required endorsements were made to his Student Pilot Certificate and logbook including the limiting SOP's. The student was briefed prior to the first solo flight that he was to make only one circuit of the traffic pattern and land to a full stop. He executed this flight successfully and without problem.

During the post first solo de-briefing the Student Pilot was informed of the limitations applicable to his solo operation of the aircraft and specifically that "touch and go's" were prohibited.

A second solo flight that followed a dual training flight was carried out later that day. During this flight the Student Pilot was observed executing "touch and go's". Post this flight the Student was debriefed by both the instructor that authorized his initial solo and the instructor who conducted the flight immediately prior. He was reminded of the limitations applicable to his solo authorization and told in no uncertain terms that "touch and go's" were prohibited.

On the day of the accident, the Student Pilot was executing his third solo flight following a successful dual training flight during which go-arounds were again practiced. The first landing was made to a full stop and a taxi back executed. During the second circuit ATC broadcast a report, two possibly three times, that winds were gusting to 14 knots. The student pilot executed a touch and go on his next landing and the tower questioned his actions, he apologized.

During the third approach to landing, the Student Pilot executed a go-around, during which the aircraft was observed to climbing poorly and appeared to be at a slow airspeed. During the go-around the aircraft started to traverse to the left heading directly towards the VOR and VHF antenna installation. Shortly before collision with the VOR and VHF antenna installation the aircraft was observed to abruptly pitch up whereupon it commenced to yaw and roll to the left. The aircraft then stalled, hit the ground suffering severe structural damage after which a fire started and destroyed the aircraft. The Student Pilot exited the aircraft unaided but after the fire had started.

Post accident examination of the accident site and aircraft confirmed that the engine was operating at a high or full power setting evidenced by the multiple propeller strike marks on the ground and the wing flaps were at 30 degrees (full-flap) at the time of impact.

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Post by mr crow »

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Eidw 747
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OBA

Post by Eidw 747 »

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=MIA07IA052&rpt=p

Nose gear collapsed after a "Hard" Landing?? Wouldnt give me much faith in this aircraft in all fairness?? Ive seen Cessnas Bashed down runways every day for 20 - 30 years of their lives and never a problem?? Liberty is a strange choice for a training a/c in all fairness??

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Re: N550XL Accident Report

Post by hibby »

CaptCream, I can't find that report on the NTSB website. I've searched using the aircraft type, the place, and the registration number. Can you provide a link?

I notice the registration number in your heading N550XL seems to be the same plane that suffered the prop-strike and broken nose-gear in February (see Eidw 747's link above).


CaptCream wrote:NTSB 6120 Narrative - Aircraft Accident N550XL

"The company has a policy and standard operating procedure (SOP) for all solo operations that "touch and go's" are not permitted.
Additionally for Student pilots undergoing solo flight the following additional limitations are endorsed:

Max. Wind: 12 knots
Max Crosswind: 06 knots
Visibility: 5 s.m.
Ceiling: 2,000 feet
[...]
Post accident examination of the accident site and aircraft confirmed that the engine was operating at a high or full power setting evidenced by the multiple propeller strike marks on the ground and the wing flaps were at 30 degrees (full-flap) at the time of impact.


Edited to add: I see this was posted on pprune by Adrian Thompson of OBA. It's not clear in that post what was written by NTSB and what was written by Adrian Thompson.

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Post by CaptCream »

Hi hibby,

Your right, I got it off pprune. Can't find it on the ntsb site either. I believe that it is more or less correct in its contents as a friend of mine was there when it hapened. I was there myself a few months ago. I have spent 7 weeks there over the last 2 years and have flown over 80hrs with them. 50hrs on the Liberty XL2. I would not be a fan of this aircraft. The accident reports speak for themselves.

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NTSB Official Record

Post by CaptCream »

NTSB Identification: NYC07LA196
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, August 19, 2007 in Ormond Beach, FL
Aircraft: Liberty Aerospace Inc. XL2, registration: N550XL
Injuries: 1 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On August 19, 2007, at approximately 1212 eastern daylight time, a Liberty Aerospace XL2, N550XL, was destroyed when it impacted terrain during an aborted landing at Ormond Beach Municipal Airport (OMN) in Ormond Beach, Florida. The certificated student pilot, the sole person on board, sustained serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. No flight plan was filed for the local instructional flight, which was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

According to witnesses, the flight originated at OMN, and the student pilot was practicing takeoffs and landings on runway 8. During the second or third landing attempt, the pilot initiated a go-around for undetermined reasons. During the go-around, the airplane drifted to the left of the runway toward the very high frequency omni-directional range (VOR) facility located on the airport. The airplane then pitched up and banked to the left, and shortly thereafter impacted the ground in a left-wing-low attitude. The pilot then extracted himself unassisted from the airplane during the post-impact fire.

The student pilot was a United Kingdom citizen with approximately 30 total hours of flight experience. He was expressly in the United States for his flight training. He had conducted his first, second and third solo flights on the day prior to the accident. The accident flight was this student's first solo flight of the day, and his second flight of the day.

The airplane, a 2006 model, had accumulated approximately 200 total hours of operation since new. The airplane was operated by Ormond Beach Aviation, a flight training school based at OMN.

The 1245 automated weather observation system for OMN reported wind from 080 degrees at 10 knots with gusts to 17 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, scattered clouds at 2500 and 3400 feet, temperature 90 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 81 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury.

The air traffic control tower at OMN was operating at the time of the accident. The airport had two asphalt runways. Runway 8/26 was 4,004 feet long and 75 feet wide, and runway 17/35 was 3,701 feet long and 100 feet wide. These runways intersected at approximately the midpoint of runway 8/26 and the northern third of runway 17/35. Runway 8 was equipped with a two light precision approach path indicator system, set for a three degree glide path. The OMN VOR was located approximately 600 feet northeast of the runway intersection. The VOR structure was approximately 50 feet in diameter at the base, and stood approximately 35 feet high. Four other antennae approximately 30 feet tall were situated in a row that extended approximately 100 feet from the VOR to the northwest.

The initial ground scar, approximately 48 feet south of the main wreckage, contained portions of a red lens. Another ground scar approximately 8 inches wide extended from the initial ground scar to a gouge located approximately 20 feet south the main wreckage. Portions of the propeller and windshield were found within this gouge.

The main wreckage was located at a point approximately 600 feet north of runway 8-26, and 250 feet east of runway 17-35. The fuselage and the inboard portions of the wings and horizontal stabilizers were consumed by fire. The left wing was found separated from the fuselage. The left and right ailerons were attached to their respective wings, and moved freely when their pushrods were hand-actuated at their respective wing roots. The flap actuator was found in the extended position, and measured approximately 4.5 inches from the actuator to the end of the rod. This measurement corresponds to a 30 degree (full down) flap setting. The elevator trim tab actuator was extended approximately 1 inch, which corresponded to a trim tab position between neutral and full airplane nose up.

The control (push-pull) tubes running from the rudder pedals to the tail section were consumed by fire. Attach fittings and hardware for these control tubes were found in their appropriate locations at the rudder pedals and in the tail cone. The elevator control tubes running from the cockpit to the tail cone were also consumed by fire. Their attach fittings and hardware were also found in their appropriate locations near the cockpit and the tail cone.

The wood propeller was highly fragmented. A Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IOF-240-B4B full authority digital engine control (FADEC) equipped engine was installed in the airplane. The engine remained partially attached to the rest of the wreckage by control and electrical cables. The engine was equipped with an Engine Data Interface (EDI) unit. The EDI stored raw and fault FADEC data on a compact flash (CF) card. The FADEC data could be downloaded for engine troubleshooting and trend analysis. The EDI was found in the wreckage, but field examination and disassembly revealed that the CF card was destroyed by fire. The engine was recovered and shipped to the TCM factory in Mobile AL, for further examination.

The flight school's website states that the school is intended "?specifically for European pilots, wishing to qualify for their JAA?" licenses. According to the owner of the flight school, "the company has a policy and standard operating procedure (SOP) for all solo operations that "touch and go's" are not permitted.." In addition, the flight school imposed wind limitations of 12 knots maximum and 6 knots crosswind on its student pilots for solo flights

The owner of the flight school also stated that the student pilot had received dual instruction and practice in takeoffs, landings and go-arounds, and that he had been explicitly briefed on the flight school's limitations regarding solo flights.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_i ... 1520&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC07LA196&rpt=p

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Post by Lambada Crazy »

Eidw 747,

Yes liberty opted for an unusual design, but they really have to be Hopped, Bashed and Buried into the ground before it collapses,
Its very unusual to land, because theres no point in a wheel on the front, they should of just put a large spring :D WHen you hit the nosewheel off the ground you just here this "boooiiiinnnn" like a spring, and then your suddenly 50ft back into the air. half in the flare at about 30 KTS,-------- = Frightning! lol

They are unlike a lot of aircraft but they dont leave room for Error, It is possible on a hard landing that the nosewheel can flex so much that you can have a propstrike.
When a flight is proceeding incredibly well, something was forgotten.

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